This article examines the institutional framework and organisational structure of resolution authorities within the European Union, positioning the Polish solutions regarding the Bank Guarantee Fund (BFG) within a broader comparative legal context. The author analyses four institutional typologies and various organisational models, highlighting the challenges of maintaining operational independence in authorities with complex functional structures. The article demonstrates that integrating the functions of a deposit guarantee scheme and a resolution authority may be favoured by the EU legislator due to financial synergies, the mitigation of conflicts of interest, and the systemic safeguards embedded in EU law. The Polish model is presented as a modern standard that minimises the risk of supervisory forbearance. Utilizing punctuated equilibrium theory and the regulatory life cycle concept, the author assesses the efficiency and risks of specific institutional models. The analysis proves that the Polish system is currently entering a phase of mass judicial review. The article concludes by postulating the development of autonomous standards of judicial review in Poland that reflect the specificities of resolution and transcend the mere application of conventional and pre-existing evaluative patterns.