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Dr hab. Jakub Kociubiński
ORCID: 0000-0002-4391-7439

Professor at the University of Wrocław, Poland. Research and didactic employee of the Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics. He specializes in the issues of EU competition law, with particular emphasis on issues in the field of State aid and transport regulations.

 
DOI: 10.33226/0137-5490.2023.3.2
JEL: K20, K21

The State's involvement in the economy tends to increase as the economic situation worsens. At the same time there is an observable decline in private sector investments. In this context, this paper aims to put forward a case for revision of the Market Economy Operator Test (MEOT) to better reflect these evolving market conditions. The analysis will seek to verify the initial assumption that the current interpretative approach to the MEOT may fail to recognize the difference between rational and realistic transactions and to determine whether improvements are possible, feasible and appropriate under the EU Treaties.

Keywords: State aid; market economy operator principle; pari passu investor; normal market conditions
DOI: 10.33226/0137-5490.2022.5.2
JEL: K21, K23, K33, K34

The application of the selectivity criterion forming a part of the State aid definition under the European Union Law is widely regarded as highly problematic owing to the need to establish a general benchmark in order to establish whether there has been a preferential treatment, anytime when a measure under scrutiny have a scope extending beyond specifically named undertakings. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the existing European case-law and the European Commission's decisions on the selectivity criterion with a particular emphasis on its evolution observable in the newer acquis, and on this basis to verify the hypothesis that the interpretative standard adopted to the assessment of the selectivity criterion for non-tax measures is conceptually inadequate and the direction of changes is incapable of addressing these deficiencies. Within this framework the author formulates a postulate regarding modification of the interpretative standard with an aim to increase transparency and reduce arbitrariness in State aid assessments.

Keywords: EU law; State aid; selectivity; general scheme of the system; relevant market
DOI: 10.33226/0137-5490.2021.10.4
JEL: K21, K29, H71

The use of private intermediaries constitute one of the aspect of the privatization of public tasks whereby these intermediaries use the funds obtained from the State to conclude business contracts with undertakings thus fulfilling public policy objectives. From a State aid perspective, this raises the challenge when intermediaries' activities shall be imputable to the State to fall within the ambit of State aid rules especially when their commercial interest is at least partially dependent upon allocation of State's funds. In the light of the above, this paper will attempt to answer the questions when States can be deemed have acted as rational operators in a market economy, by providing remuneration for services offered by intermediaries, and conversely when States' conduct may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. Whether the existing legal framework can identify possible impacts on competition and trade resulting from intermediaries' activities.

Keywords: state aid; Market Economy Operator Test; imputability criterion; privatisation of public tasks
DOI: 10.33226/0137-5490.2020.2.2

Start-up aid seeks facilitate airlines' entry into new
regional markets. It is designed as an alternative to a
widespread, and combatted by the European
Commission, practice of offering advantageous discounts
of airport charges and various marketing contracts to air
carriers in exchange for entering a given regional market.
Start-up aid is designed to be time-limited and once
expired, the route is intended to become profitable and
thus the operating carrier would be economically
incentivised to remain on that market.
The research shows that airlines seeking to obtain
subsidies are not interesting to remain on the market
once state aid expires but are inclined to relocate their
operations in order to receive new start-up aid. This
brings up the question of how to perceive the
effectiveness of start-up aid in the light of the regulatory
challenge of using public funds as a stimulus for air routes
that intends to be commercially viable.

Keywords: State Aid; Start-up Aid; Regional Airports; Incentive Effect; Air Transport; Effectiveness of Law