Imposing various levies, where financial burdens are shifted to undertakings, is one of the evolving forms of funding various activities by the State. They are highly challenging to assess for potential State aid because, while it is prima facie apparent that they may confer an advantage for selected market players due to bypassing the government budget, they may not meet the required condition of involving State resources as interpreted in state aid acquis. Measures must comprise State resources to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since the Court – contrary to the literal wording of the treaty’s provision – regards State resources and imputability to the State as cumulative rather than alternative conditions. In a series of ruling from September 2024 concerning compulsory energy surcharges, the Court formulated two alternative tests to determine when levies bypassing the government budget may constitute State resources. In this context, the author presents and will attempt to justify the position that these new jurisprudential developments are, to use the title’s licentia poetica, attempts to mend a self-inflicted wound. The tests are ambiguous and arbitrary, ultimately leading to questionable interpretations. None of these interpretive problems and the resulting gap in State aid control would exist had Article 107(1) TFEU been interpreted literally – as comprising alternative criteria of State resources and imputability.

This paper seeks to analyse the new interpretive approach taken by the Court of Justice in State aid cases. According to this approach, evaluating the impact on competition and trade is considered essential to determine whether an entity that is not a beneficiary of the European Commission's decision can be regarded as an 'interested party'. The author will assess the potential consequences of this interpretive approach, particularly examining whether evaluating the impact on trade and competition is an appropriate tool to guarantee access to the Court in State aid cases, especially for indirect competitors and plaintiffs claiming infringement of their non-economic interests.

The State's involvement in the economy tends to increase as the economic situation worsens. At the same time there is an observable decline in private sector investments. In this context, this paper aims to put forward a case for revision of the Market Economy Operator Test (MEOT) to better reflect these evolving market conditions. The analysis will seek to verify the initial assumption that the current interpretative approach to the MEOT may fail to recognize the difference between rational and realistic transactions and to determine whether improvements are possible, feasible and appropriate under the EU Treaties.

The application of the selectivity criterion forming a part of the State aid definition under the European Union Law is widely regarded as highly problematic owing to the need to establish a general benchmark in order to establish whether there has been a preferential treatment, anytime when a measure under scrutiny have a scope extending beyond specifically named undertakings. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the existing European case-law and the European Commission's decisions on the selectivity criterion with a particular emphasis on its evolution observable in the newer acquis, and on this basis to verify the hypothesis that the interpretative standard adopted to the assessment of the selectivity criterion for non-tax measures is conceptually inadequate and the direction of changes is incapable of addressing these deficiencies. Within this framework the author formulates a postulate regarding modification of the interpretative standard with an aim to increase transparency and reduce arbitrariness in State aid assessments.

The use of private intermediaries constitute one of the aspect of the privatization of public tasks whereby these intermediaries use the funds obtained from the State to conclude business contracts with undertakings thus fulfilling public policy objectives. From a State aid perspective, this raises the challenge when intermediaries' activities shall be imputable to the State to fall within the ambit of State aid rules especially when their commercial interest is at least partially dependent upon allocation of State's funds. In the light of the above, this paper will attempt to answer the questions when States can be deemed have acted as rational operators in a market economy, by providing remuneration for services offered by intermediaries, and conversely when States' conduct may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. Whether the existing legal framework can identify possible impacts on competition and trade resulting from intermediaries' activities.

Start-up aid seeks facilitate airlines' entry into new
regional markets. It is designed as an alternative to a
widespread, and combatted by the European
Commission, practice of offering advantageous discounts
of airport charges and various marketing contracts to air
carriers in exchange for entering a given regional market.
Start-up aid is designed to be time-limited and once
expired, the route is intended to become profitable and
thus the operating carrier would be economically
incentivised to remain on that market.
The research shows that airlines seeking to obtain
subsidies are not interesting to remain on the market
once state aid expires but are inclined to relocate their
operations in order to receive new start-up aid. This
brings up the question of how to perceive the
effectiveness of start-up aid in the light of the regulatory
challenge of using public funds as a stimulus for air routes
that intends to be commercially viable.