Using the OTC market to minimize systemic risk in DeFi. Practical considerations regarding the Solend lending protocol incident

The article presents practical considerations for minimizing systemic risk in the decentralized finance (DeFi) sector through the utilization of over-thecounter (OTC) cryptocurrency markets. The focus is on analysing the Solend scandal case, where shortcomings in financial risk management within the Solend application necessitated the takeover of a user's wallet to facilitate the liquidation of a collateral deposit on the OTC market. The article proposes that future legal regulations governing DeFi should incorporate the possibility of conducting off-exchange liquidation of collateral deposits in cases where on-exchange liquidation poses a potential source of systemic risk to the DeFi sector. Additionally, the article describes the advantages and disadvantages of OTC cryptocurrency markets and suggests drawing upon solutions implemented in the OTC derivative market following the 2008 economic crisis to ensure thorough regulation of the OTC cryptocurrency market.

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Akty prawne/Legal acts
Rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2023/1114 z dnia 31.05.2023 r. w sprawie rynków kryptoaktywów oraz zmiany rozporządzeń (UE) nr 1093/2010 i (UE) nr 1095/2010 oraz dyrektyw 2013/36/UE i (UE) 2019/1937 (Dz. Urz. UE L z 2023 r. nr 150, s. 40).
Ustawa z dnia 23.04.1964 r. Kodeks cywilny (t.j. Dz.U. z 2022 r., poz. 1360 z późn. zm.).

Orzecznictwo/Judgments
Wyrok SN z 27.10.2016 r., V CSK 48/16, Lex nr 2165600.

Inne źródła/Other sources
Propozycja zarządcza nr 1. (2022). SLND1: Ograniczyć ryzyko związane z wielorybem. https://govern.solend.fi/dao/SLND/proposal/
HuaL6cDtuNtfnJgvwMnYiZDHVCoLAuDtVFgJD8kYChJ4.
Propozycja zarządcza nr 2. (2022). SLND2: Unieważnić SLND1 i zwiększyć czas głosowania. https://govern.solend.fi/dao/SLND/proposal/3geE5P3D7VJRaNNDVfZciGsXgwGiao1hSNpRM6jWNa5A
Propozycja zarządcza nr 3. (2022). SLND3: Wprowadzić limit pożyczek na konto. https://govern.solend.fi/dao/SLND/proposal/
CmrzCA2vQxqptyzZ8A9RSG9GeC7gB8nxKs2RvXiiwvh6