Inside information has been defined by the EU legislator in two acts applicable to two different markets – the crypto-assets market and the financial instruments market. As the first, the legal definition of inside information for the purposes of combating market abuse in the financial instruments market has been enacted and can be found in Article 7 of Regulation 596/2014 (MAR). As a second, inspired by the first, a legal definition of inside information for the purposes of combating market abuse in the crypto-assets market has been enacted and can be found in Article 87 of Regulation 2023/1114. The two definitions, from a linguistic perspective, are remarkably similar and will therefore be scrutinised together in order to demonstrate the proper interpretative approach using the tools of legal theory. In this article, I present and defend the thesis that the concepts of reasonable investor and reasonable holder determine the understanding of 'significant effect on the prices' and, consequently, both definitions of inside information are one-step instead of two-step in this respect.

The article presents the issue of maintaining the insider list referred to in Article 18 MAR in the capital group. The main research problem analysed by the authors is whether the provisions MAR constitute the legal basis for including the employees of the issuer's subsidiaries in the insider list maintained by the issuer (the parent company). In the authors' opinion, employees of subsidiaries having preferential access to inside information produced in a subsidiary should be considered as persons to be included in the insider list maintained by the issuer. The proposed interpretation is consistent with all views treating the capital group as a single economic unit, pursuing an interest that is essentially convergent for all participants of the group.