Business judgment rule in Delaware law and judiciary

The purpose of this article is to present and evaluate the business judgment rule (BJR) in Delaware law and case law as one of the key institutions of corporate law with practical, normative, and economic significance. The paper discusses the normative structure of the BJR, the rationale for its application, and its role in protecting management’s decision-making, which determines risk-taking, including radical risk. The article utilizes a dogmatic legal approach and legal exegesis to systematize Delaware’s case law and normative output. American literature on corporate law, management, and economics is also considered, demonstrating the complementary relationship between the BJR and corporate governance and compliance practices. Following the evaluation of the BJR, it was determined that it constitutes a dynamic doctrine that balances managers’ discretionary power with their responsibility, which not only shapes corporate governance practice but also influences the stability and predictability of Delaware’s law and economic 

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