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DOI: 10.33226/0137-5490.2021.11.1
JEL: K22, K33, K34

International tax competition versus optimisation strategies adopted by holding companies in tax havens

The subject-matter of the article is presentation of the phenomenon of international tax competition which is related to the developing tax policies of countries. It is particularly important to distinguish the phenomenon under discussion from harmful tax competition. In the course of elaboration, it is necessary to mention tax havens that exert a substantial influence both on international and harmful tax competition. Holding companies also influence international tax competition as they adopt numerous tax engineering instruments within the framework of their tax strategies. The present article indicates the most important as well as the most up-to-date ones. The elaboration also presents how the relations and links that are being shaped between countries that are tax havens (though not only) and international holding companies impact international tax competition.

Keywords: tax competition; tax optimisation; tax havens; holding



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