Contestability and fairness in the AI value chain – an analysis of potential risks under competition law and the Digital Markets Act

The aim of this article is to analyse the threats to contestability and fairness in the artificial intelligence (AI) value chain from the perspective of EU competition law and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). In particular, it assesses the impact of resource concentration – including compute, data, and human capital – as well as vertical integration along the AI value chain, understood as the sequence of stages and inputs required to design, train, deploy, and commercialise foundation models and generative AI services. The article discusses exclusionary practices that may restrict access to key resources and entrench dominant positions, highlighting the limitations of Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in addressing structural risks. It also evaluates the preventive potential of the DMA and identifies its limitations in the context of emerging technological architectures. The conclusion calls for deeper regulatory reflection and a possible revision of existing legal instruments to preserve the conditions of contestability and fairness in the rapidly evolving AI ecosystem.

Bibliografia/References

AI Index. (2024). AI Index report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report

AI Now Institute. (2023). Computational power and AI. https://ainowinstitute.org/publications/compute-and-ai

Autoridade da Concorrência. (2023). Competition and Generative Artificial Intelligence: Issues Paper. Autoridade da Concorrência. https://www.concorrencia.pt/sites/default/files/documentos/Issues%20Paper%20-%20Competition%20and%20Generative%20Artificial%20Intelligence.pdf

Autorité de la concurrence. (2024). Opinion 24-A-05 of June 28, 2024 on the competitive functioning of the generative artificial intelligence sector. https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/commitments/2024-09/24a05_eng.pdf

Bank for International Settlements (BIS). (2024). The AI supply chain. BIS Papers, (154). https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap154.pdf

Belloso, N. M., & Petit, N. (2023). The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA): A competition hand in a regulatory glove. European Law Review, 48. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4411743

Bommasani, R., Hudson, D. A., Adeli, E., Altman, R., Arora, S., von Arx, S., ..., & Liang, P. (2021). On the opportunities and risks of foundation models. Stanford Center for Research on Foundation Models. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07258

Carugati, C. (2023). The difficulty of designating gatekeepers under the EU Digital Markets Act. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/difficulty-designating-gatekeepers-under-eu-digital-markets-act

Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). (2025). A competition policy for cloud and AI. https://cerre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/ACompetition-Policy-for-Cloud-and-AI_FINAL.pdf

Cloudflare. (2024). What is vendor lock-in? Vendor lock-in and cloud computing. Cloudflare Learning Center. https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/cloud/what-is-vendor-lock-in/

Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). (2024). Initial review of foundation models. https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/ai-foundation-models-initial-review

Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). (2023). AI foundation models: Initial report. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65081d3aa41cc300145612c0/Full_report_.pdf

Copenhagen Economics. (2024, March). Generative Artificial Intelligence: The competitive landscape. https://copenhageneconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Copenhagen-Economics-Generative-Artificial-Intelligence-The-Competitive-Landscape.pdf

Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). (2025). 2025 economic report of the President. Executive Office of the President. https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea

Dunne, N. (2020). Dispensing with indispensability. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 16(1), 74–115. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa004

Federal Trade Commission (FTC). (2023). Competition in Generative AI Markets Federal Trade Commission. https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy-research/tech-at-ftc/2023/06/generative-ai-raises-competition-concerns

Graef, I. (2019). Differentiated Treatment in Platform-to-Business Relations: EU Competition Law and Economic Dependence. Yearbook of European Law, 38(1), 448–499. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3597678

Hacker, P., Cordes, J., & Rochon, J. (2022). Regulating gatekeeper AI and data: Transparency, access, and fairness under the DMA, the GDPR, and beyond. SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 4316944. European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4316944

Hoppner, T., & Streatfeild, L. (2023). ChatGPT, Bard & Co.: An introduction to AI for competition and regulatory lawyers. Hausfeld Competition Bulletin, 9(1), Article 1. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4371681

Hoppner, T., & Uphues, S. (2024). On the antitrust implications of embedding generative AI in core platform services. CPI Antitrust Chronicles, (July/I), 8–19. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4904876

Komisja Europejska (KE). (2024). Competition in Generative AI and Virtual Worlds. Competition Policy Brief No 3/2024. European Union. https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c86d461f-062e-4dde-a662-15228d6ca385_en

Korinek, A., & Vipra, J. (2024). Concentrating intelligence: Scaling and market structure in artificial intelligence. Working Paper No. 228. https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_228-Korinek-and-Vipra.pdf

Małobęcka-Szwast, I. (2021). Big Data and the abuse of a dominant position by data-driven online platforms under EU Competition Law. C.H.Beck.

Materna, G., & Szmigielski, A. (2024). Komentarz do art. 1 DMA. W: M. Grochowski (red.), Rynek cyfrowy. Akt o usługach cyfrowych. Akt o rynkach cyfrowych. Rozporządzenie platform-to-business. Komentarz. C.H.Beck.

Mayer Brown. (2024). AI Challenges in Competition Law. How are regulators responding? https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/ perspectives-events/publications/2024/04/ai-challenges-in-competition-law_ mar24.pdf%3Frev=55168f8e10a64e458c3fc1ac7af179df

OECD. (2024). Artificial Intelligence, data and competition. OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/artificial-intelligencedata-and- competition-e7e88884-en.htm

OECD. (2025). Competition in the provision of cloud computing services. OECD Publishing https://www.oecd.org

Opara Martins, J, Sahandi, R & Tian, F. (2016). Critical analysis of vendor lock-in and its impact on cloud computing migration: A business perspective. Journal of Cloud Computing, 5(4). https://journalofcloudcomputing.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13677-016-0054-z

Peitz, M. (2023). The prohibition of self-preferencing in the DMA. W: A. de Streel i in. (red.), Effective and proportionate implementation of the DMA. Centre on Regulation in Europe.

Stucke, M. E., & Ezrachi, A. (2024). Antitrust & AI Supply Chains. Research Paper No. 474. University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4754655

Szmigielski, A. (2024). Odmowa dostępu do platformy internetowej jako przejaw nadużywania pozycji dominującej. Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego, (10), 35–42. https://doi.org/10.33226/0137-5490.2024.10.5

Valdivia, A. (2018). The scope of the “special responsibility” upon vertically integrated dominant firms after the Google shopping case: Is there a duty to treat rivals equally and refrain from favouring own related business? World Competition, 41(1).

Vipra, J., & Korinek, A. (2023). Market concentration implications of foundation models. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.01550

Yasar, A. G., Chong, A., Dong, E., Gilbert, T. K., Hladikova, S., Maio, R., Mougan, C., Shen, X., Singh, S., Stoica, A.-A., Thais, S., & Zilka, M. (2023). AI and the EU Digital Markets Act: Addressing the risks of bigness in generative AI. W: Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning (PMLR Vol. 202, pp. 1–4). PMLR. https://blog.genlaw.org/CameraReady/13.pdf