The way of organizing the institutional aspect of financial market supervision is important when assessing its effectiveness and efficiency, especially in the era of very dynamic technological progress. Therefore, the indication in this paper of how supervision over financial conglomerates is organized in French law may be an interesting source of discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of various types of supervision models. The French model is quite a specific example in this respect, because, unlike the fully centralized Polish model, it consists of two cooperating institutions: Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) and Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR). The analysis carried out in this article allowed to answer the question about theoretical compatibility and adjustment of the two-pillar model of supervision over the financial market to financial conglomerates. What is worth noting is that in many aspects, including in relation to financial conglomerates, this two-pillar model is potentially better adapted than the centralized one. The methodology used by the author is related to the functional aspect of the comparative method, the historical-descriptive method and the dogmatic method, with particular emphasis on the regulations of French law.

The institutional aspect of the organization of supervision over the financial market, in the era of globalization of the world economy and the challenges that arise with technological progress, is today one of the key elements of the financial security of every country. Thus, the purpose of this article will be to analyse a rather specific, because not fully centralized, system of supervision over the financial market in France, with particular emphasis on the so-called consultative institutions regulated by the Monetary and Financial Code. The above will allow for a better understanding of the two-pillar supervision model, under which the main supervisory authority, i.e. the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), is supplemented not only by the auxiliary body in the form of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), but also by a number of consulting institutions. The above aspect, which has not been previously the subject of in-depth analyses, will also allow for reflection on the verification of the thesis on the potential implementation of some French models to the model of financial market supervision in Poland.

The issue and specificity of a group of companies in French law was shaped on the basis of the judgment in the Rozenblum case of 1985. In this paper the author not only translates the most important original content of the judgment, but also analyzes it (also in historical way) from the perspective of the specificity of the French legal system. This specificity of the entire legal system, expressed in a rather original way of editing the codes or the extremely important role of jurisprudence, may explain the difficulties in direct implementation of the described concept of a group of companies under other legal orders. Thus, the aim of this article is not only to analyze and comment on the original wording of the above-cited judgment, but also to analyze the previously un-cited part of the French doctrine, which presents the judgment in question in a new French-language perspective that has not yet been the subject of in-depth analyzes. The above will also allow for the verification of the thesis about difficulties in direct implementation of the above-mentioned concepts in other legal orders due to the specificity of the French legal system, very strongly influenced by the role of practice and jurisprudence in the law-making process.