The subject of the research presented in the article is the Rear Area of Activity (RAA), which is a part of the theater of military operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (AF RP) as part of the national defense operation on the territory of Poland. The aim of the research included in the article is to check, verify and assess the validity of the deployment of military stationary material depots and repair workshops in the country during peacetime, as well as to examine the adopted doctrinal solutions in terms of maintaining the ability of the logistic system to ensure that fighting troops can maintain their operations. The research hypothesis adopted for consideration assumes that the location of the military stationary logistics infrastructure (material depots and repair workshops), due to the existing threat directions and the possibility of destruction of the logistics potential by the enemy, requires the transfer of part of the defense potential from the zone of direct operations to the RAA. The conclusions drawn allow us to state that in the current geopolitical conditions of Poland there is a need to transfer part of the stationary logistics potential of the army already in peacetime from the first zone of the theater of operations to the second and third ones. Moreover, taking into account the operational base, the authors of the study also found it necessary to implement changes in the organization of the mobile logistics potential of tactical level II.

The subject of research presented in the article are the processes taking place in the national security environment, determining the need to strengthen defence capabilities in terms of protecting critical infrastructure facilities of the state. The purpose of the research is to check, verify and evaluate the functioning of the critical infrastructure protection system of the state and to demonstrate the need for its protection in the light of possible threats. From the opinions of experts in the field of national security, a research hypothesis emerges, which shows that despite taking multidirectional actions, the state administration operating at many organizational levels is not able to foresee all the threats that lie in wait for critical infrastructure facilities. Empirical research methods were used in the study: analysis and criticism of the literature, desk research and a diagnostic survey conducted using the interview technique with experts and military analysts. From the theoretical methods, the following were used: analysis, synthesis, and inference methods. The conducted research shows that there are premises to ensure that critical infrastructure facilities are effectively protected against harmful and destructive intentional or random actions. The problem in ensuring proper protection of critical infrastructure is the fact that they are a relatively accessible and easy target for terrorist attacks, sabotage groups or special groups. Therefore, steps should first be taken to identify which facilities and systems constitute critical infrastructure of strategic, regional and local importance.

The article presents selected examples of implementation of support tasks by the host nation support for the benefit of allied and partner troops, performing tasks on the territory of Poland, resulting from the new geopolitical conditions in which Central and Eastern Europe found itself. The resulting threats and dynamics of change forced the Alliance's authorities to take a new approach to strengthening NATO's eastern flank as part of improving the region's security. As a result of the actions undertaken, the exercises in Poland and the Baltic countries, the relocation of allied troops by our territory and their deployment as a result of the eFP (enhanced Forward Presence) and Operation Atlantic Resolve were intensified.

As a consequence, the increase in the involvement of the alliance in the performance of tasks on our territory requires increased participation in the HNS, not only the military system of the state, but also involvement of the non-military defense system of the state.