The subject of the gloss is the analysis of the ruling of  the Supreme Administrative Court on the legal nature  of the fee for preschool education paid by their legal  guardians. This fee has now been shaped as a public-law  levy. However, despite such a qualification, the  question is still valid whether it arises by operation of  law or whether it is necessary to issue a decision  determining its amount. Each of these qualifications  entails specific actions of the commune authorities. In  the case of the first one, it is necessary to define all its  elements in statutory acts or local legal acts. In the case  of the latter, it is necessary to issue an individual  decision specifying its amount. The study assessed both  stands, pointing to their shortcomings, and proposed a  solution for them.

The subject of the gloss is the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court and the preceding ruling of the Provincial Administrative Court in Gorzów Wielkopolski. In these judgments, the court came to the conclusion that the municipal council had the power to directly control municipal companies. This judgment is a breach of the previous jurisprudence, assuming that the supervision and control by the audit committee of the commune council takes place indirectly through the control of the activity of the executive body of the commune. The article analyses the arguments presented by the court both against the background of the previous jurisprudence and statements of the doctrine. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that the position of the Court that allows for the control of municipal companies by audit committees is not supported by the applicable legal status. Even if it is assumed that the board may indicate such an object of control, there are no legal instruments forcing the company to submit to such control. The only instrument envisaged by the legislator is the right to individual control of companies by councilors.

The article refers to the impact of the Judgment of the General Court (of 10.09.2019 year) in the OPAL Case (T-883/16) on current and future energy policy of the European Union and its Member States. First of all it must be underlined that the present legislation and case-law did not explicitly define the concept of energy solidarity. In the legal doctrine, this term was mostly identified with the obligation of mutual assistance if, for example as a result of natural disasters, a Member State experiences a critical or emergency situation in gas supplies. That is why the judgement analyzed is crucial for proper understanding of the term of energy solidarity. In practice, it expands the concept of energy
solidarity and make it legal criterion. The court draws attention to at least two levels of understanding of the
above principle. Considering its position, the principle of energy solidarity not only concerns the interest of the
EU as the whole, but has to take into account the interests of individual Member States as well. In this respect, the commented decision is a milestone in understanding the principle of energy solidarity, its place in the legal system, and its application by the European Union and national authorities.