AI systems have the potential to revolutionize the global information space and pose a challenge to the right to information. The use of artificial intelligence in journalism brings both benefits and challenges. Doubts arise in relation to the legal regulations applicable to materials created by artificial intelligence and disseminated in the press. The question arises as to how, in connection with the catalogue of duties and rights of the press, the activities of artificial intelligence should be qualified, whether they constitute press materials and whether artificial intelligence can legally replace journalists and fulfil the obligation to inform. The article shows that, upon the applicable regulations, replacing journalists with artificial intelligence as a decision maker regarding the press content, is not possible. Such activity also does not have the characteristics of press activity due to the lack of subjective premises of the press, i.e. the lack of natural persons creating press materials. Moreover, artificial intelligence, not having legal personality, cannot be held responsible for the content of the generated content. Their publication requires prior verification by journalists.

The aim of the article is to show that an architectural work is not uniform in its form and that within it there may also be works classified as landscape architecture, for which a moral right to mark the authorship of a work should be exercised. As a result, it will also enable the proper performance of works of fair public use, which is the so-called right of the panorama, with the obligation to mark authorship. Successors of economic copyrights very often treat works of architecture and landscape architecture as purely utility items, violating moral rights, in particular by repeatedly not marking them. The utility value of the works in question should not deprive their authors of the right to decide how and whether the work is to be marked. Without the author's consent, no one should arbitrarily decide on the anonymous presentation of such works, especially since there are no real obstacles to revealing their authorship e.g. on plaques, plaques, placed in a visible place, which should become a good practice and evidence of social cultural identity.

The article undertakes an analysis of the grounds, purpose and scope of copyright limitation in relation to works permanently displayed on publicly accessible roads, streets, squares or gardens in so-called freedom of panorama. With regard to copyright restrictions, which constitute an exception to their absolute protection provided for in the Act, it is reasonable to specify and justify the purpose of permitted public use. The article indicates and justifies the basis for the restriction as: access to culture, stating that this concept is not the same as the definition of a cultural good. To this end, a concise interpretation of the restrictive provision was made, as well as an analysis of legal guarantees in the field of access to culture, cultural heritage, cultural heritage in legal regulations, with particular emphasis on the definition of the good of culture, indicating the lack of coherence of the concepts of the work and the good of culture.