This article provides a critical analysis of the Polish Supreme Court's resolution of 16 September 2020 (ref. no. III UZP 1/20), concerning the interpretation of the concept of "service for the totalitarian state." The article's purpose is to show that the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court, although motivated by just axiological premises, raises significant questions about its adherence to the established limits of judicial interpretation. The main thesis of the gloss suggests that the Supreme Court's position-which mandates an individual assessment of a functionary's actions rather than relying on formal affiliation with the institutions listed in the act-significantly departs from the literal wording of the act and the legislator's intent, bringing it close to an interpretation contra legem. The author suggests that in creating a new legal norm, the Supreme Court is operating on the borderline between judicial and legislative competences. The article also highlights the internal inconsistency the resolution introduces into the legal system, where pension authorities and courts apply different assessment criteria. The author concludes that the Court's action, while an attempt to respond to a constitutional crisis, highlights the existing tensions within the principle of the separation of powers and raises questions about the long-term effects of such an approach on the stability of the legal order.