The article discusses one of the issues that raises doubts in the doctrine and case law on the basis of Article 39 of the Labor Code regulating special protection of an employee of pre-retirement age against termination. Namely, it con­cerns whether the prohibition of termination provided for in this provision applies to employment under a fixed-term employment contract also when the contract was conclud­ed for a period that expires before the employee reaches retirement age. In the author’s opinion, the answer to this question should be negative. However, the Supreme Court expressed a different opinion in the resolution of a bench of seven judges of 30 September 2025, III PZP 6/24.

In the commentary to the decision of 4 December 2024, II CSKP 2047/22, the Supreme Court endorsed the view that there are no legal obstacles to making an entry in the land and mortgage register concerning a change of mortgagee even when the mortgage is a compulsory mortgage and was registered in favour of the assignor, a bank, based on a bank enforcement order. Arguments were presented to support this position. It was also noted that the view expressed in this ruling is not at all inconsistent with the fact that enforcement under a bank enforcement order with an enforcement clause may only be conducted for the bank’s benefit, not for another person.

The article attempts to answer the question, which is a fragment of the limitation period issue, of how to un­derstand the phrase contained in Article 295 § 2 of the Labor Code „until the proceedings initiated to pursue or establish or satisfy or secure the claim are concluded”. The point is whether it should be understood as the day on which the court decision becomes final or the day of issuing the decision by the court that last ruled in the case. The direct reason for writing it was the legal issue present­ed to the Supreme Court for resolution under Article 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the District Court in Bielsko-Biała, which by the resolution of January 22, 2025, III PZP 2/24 was referred by the ordinary bench for reso­lution to the enlarged bench of the Supreme Court of the Labor and Social Insurance Chamber.

Abstract The commented judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 March 2024, II PSKP 29/23 (OSNP 2024/12/116), deals with the call for a settlement attempt as the reason for the interruption of the limitation period (Article 295 § 1 point 1 of the Labor Code). It correctly found, among other things, that in the event of dismissal of a claim arising from an employment relationship due to the validity of the ob jection of the limitation of the claim, limiting the basis for cassation only to the violation of Article 123 § 1 point 1 of the Civil Code is insufficient to conduct a cassation review, due to the autonomy of labor law from civil law and the complete regulation of the interruption of the limitation period in Article 295 of the Labor Code. However, the Supreme Court’s view of the full autonomy of labor law from civil law in the scope of the issue of the limitation of claims goes too far. It also rightly noted that an application for a call for a settlement attempt does not always consti tute an action directly aimed at pursuing a claim within the meaning of Article 295 § 1 item 1 of the Labor Code.

In the commentary to the judgment of 11 April 2024, II PSKP 86/22 (OSNP 2024/9/91), the Supreme Court's view was approved that sending an employer a declaration of termination of an employment contract to an employee by text message does not meet the requirement of written form if it is not accompanied by a secure electronic signature (Article 30 § 3 of the Labor Code). Such a declaration should be submitted in writing within the meaning of Article 78 of the Civil Code in connection with Article 300 of the Labor Code. Submitting this declaration by fax, telegram, text message, MMS, or e-mail does not satisfy this form. The electronic form of Article 781 of the Civil Code is equivalent to written form, but its structural element is a secure electronic signature. However, an SMS message does not contain it.

The commented judgment of 19 September 2023, I PSKP 50/22 refers to the issue of the limitation period for the claim for the return of benefits resulting from the employment relationship that were unduly paid to the employee in the form of remuneration and severance pay. The Supreme Court correctly found therein that this claim is subject to a limitation period under Article 291 § 1 of the Labour Code, and not under Article 118 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 300 of the Labour Code.

The judgment under review concerns the issue of termination of an employment contract by mutual consent. Its thesis assumes that the conclusion of an agreement to terminate an employment contract may occur as a result of an offer made by one party and accepted by the other party. If the offer to terminate the employment contract by the employee has not been made in direct contact with the employer, the offer ceases to be binding at the end of the time during which the employee could, in the ordinary course of business, have received a reply sent without undue delay. In the opinion of the glossator, both the thesis of the judgment and the legal reasoning cited to justify it deserve approval.

The article discusses an issue significant both from a theoretical and practical point of view, whether in a case of an employee's claims for unjustified or unlawful termination of employment, brought against the employer under Article 415 of the Polish Civil Code (in connection with Article 300 of the Labour Code) and not under the Polish Labour Code, the competent court composition is the one defined in Article 47 para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. one judge composition), or rather in Article 47 para. 2(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. lay judges composition). There is certain divergence of views on this issue in the judicature of the Supreme Court and common courts. As it seems, the prevailing position is that a case concerning such claims is to be examined by a court composed of one judge.

The issues discussed in the article consider whether the provision of art. 130 § 2 of the Labour Code applies to educators at educational establishments working in no-summer, no-winter holidays system (Monday through Sunday 40 hours per week) for whom a territorial self-government unit is the governing body, and if under art.42c (4) of the Teacher’s Charter, such an educator is given a day off for working on a holiday, art. 130 § 3 of the Labour Code also applies.