Journal of Business Law 06/2026

The discussion in this article focuses on the legal validity of an administrative court’s ruling from the perspective of multiple entities filing complaints against the same administrative decision. Recognizing the shortcomings of procedural regulations, the author proposes supplementing them with regulations dedicated to the joinder of parties. In the article, the author argues that in certain situations, this legal institution, common within civil proceedings, is applicable in practice, even though it derives from sources other than civil procedure. This allows for the implementation of the principle of the inviolability of a final court ruling.

The aim of the discussion is to determine the place of biometric electronic signatures (the so-called dynamic signature, or in short – biometric signature) within the general structure of electronic signatures under the eIDAS Regulation and to indicate whether the processing of personal data from dynamic signatures will in all cases be subject to the restrictions of Article 9(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The lack of a legal definition of a dynamic signature, its technical nature and specific formula, combined with the characteristics of biometric data under the GDPR, raise significant interpretative doubts. The problem mainly concerns the classification of personal data processed (collected) when creating a digital version of a handwritten signature. The analysis leads to the conclusion that not every use of a dynamic signature involves the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the GDPR. Signature data will be treated as biometric only in specific situations where it is processed using special techniques for the purpose of identifying or authenticating a natural person. The authors thus point to the need for the controller to assess the context of personal data processing on a case-by-case basis, as it is the purpose and manner of use of the technology that determines whether dynamic signature data qualifies as biometric data within the meaning of the GDPR.

The application of European Union State aid law to fiscal measures is notoriously controversial, as the existing interpretative standard seeks a modus vivendi between two ultimately irreconcilable elements: On the one hand, the exclusive national competences in the field of direct taxation, and on the other, the so-called objective concept of aid requiring the assessment of measures on the basis of actual effects, i.e. enabling taxes to be included in the scope of Article 107 TFEU. In the three-element test developed in the case law of the Court of Justice, taxes and the so-called special levies – charges imposed “on top” of the tax system – are treated differently in the reference framework used to assess selectivity. In analysing the most recent acquis, the author argues that this differentiated treatment is unjustified; that it constitutes an artificial division which, under the already highly suboptimal conditions of the existing Treaty-based division of competences, only needlessly complicates the interpretation of Article 107 TFEU and of the selectivity criterion, which is already difficult to apply.

Although each year there are more reports and scientific publications indicating the growing adverse effects of excessive and poorly directed light on various elements of the natural environment and society, this issue is still not fully regulated by law at the EU and national levels. The general aim of this study is to analyse EU legal provisions and compare the regulations of selected member states concerning the prevention of light pollution. The thesis presented in this paper is that the lack of common legal frameworks clearly regulating light pollution results in highly varied legal actions taken by member states, which complicates the effective reduction of this problem, especially in the context of its often cross-border nature.

The aim of this article is to examine the scope of freedom in tax planning in relation to the restrictive nature of determining the appropriate transaction. The author defends two theses. First, a taxpayer, when planning their actions, enjoys a relatively broad scope of freedom, defined by the hypothesis of the anti-tax avoidance clause. To a limited extent, their actions may even exhibit signs of abusiveness. Second, when tax abuse, as understood under Article 119a § 1 of the Tax Ordinance, occurs, this freedom becomes significantly restricted. The Head of the National Revenue Administration, when determining the appropriate transaction, must, in principle, indicate a single transaction that is free of abusiveness and rational, with this rationality being relativized to the specific circumstances of the given entity.

If an investment fund company managing an investment fund loses its permit to manage the fund in connection with a sanction decision of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority or such a permit expires, the investment fund loses the body responsible for its management and representation. In the described extraordinary situation provisions of law provide that the custodian of the investment fund is responsible for its representation. The article analyses the legal basis and scope of the depositary’s authority to represent investment fund as well as aim to qualify custodian representation from the perspective of private law institutions.

Performing sexual services for remuneration is generally considered immoral, and a contract in which one party undertakes to provide a sexual service and the other party undertakes to pay remuneration for that service is usually considered invalid. Consequently, the remuneration paid for the service should be reimbursed under Art. 405 in conjunction with art. 410 § 2 of the Civil Code. A demand for a refund of remuneration for a sexual service may raise doubts as to its compliance with the principles of social coexistence. The situation might be analysed in the light of the Civil Code on two grounds, i.e. Art. 411 p. 2 and Art. 5 of the Civil Code. The study presents the rules for the application of both provisions, the relationship between them, and the possibility of applying them to the situation of a demand for reimbursement of remuneration for a sexual service. The analysis shows that Art. 411 p. 2 of the Civil Code, which allows the recipient to retain the benefit if it complies with the principles of social coexistence, should not constitute a legal basis for excluding the return of undue benefits performed in the course of a legal act that was incompatible with the principles of social coexistence. In such cases the exclusion of reimbursement of an undue benefit may be based on Art. 5 of the Civil Code.

The article constitutes an approving commentary on a resolution adopted by a panel of seven judges of the Supreme Court. It addresses an issue that has for years given rise to disputes in both legal doctrine and case law, namely whether a credit agreement constitutes a reciprocal contract. The commentary provides an overview of the positions expressed in the literature and judicial decisions. It then outlines the concept of a reciprocal contract and examines the legal nature of the performances owed by the parties to a credit agreement. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the lender’s performance – consisting in the disbursement or making available of the credit amount as well as in the deferral of its repayment – is rendered for the purpose of obtaining the borrower’s performance in the form of interest or commission. Conversely, the borrower undertakes to pay interest and commission in order to receive the credit amount and to be able to use it for a specified period without the obligation to repay it prior to the agreed date. Accordingly, the performance of each party is rendered for the purpose of obtaining the performance of the other party, which fully corresponds to the concept of a reciprocal contract.