Business Law Journal 03/2023

The subject of the article is an analysis of the provisions of Art. 99 sec. 3 points 2–3 of the Pharmaceutical Law (PL), which provide for anti-concentration restrictions for entities running pharmacies, and the provisions of Art. 37ap sec. 1 point 2 of the PL, according to which the authority issuing the permit to operate a generally accessible pharmacy withdraws the permit if the entrepreneur no longer meets the conditions set out in the law, required to perform the business activity specified in the permit. The article formulates two research issues: whether the provisions of Art. 99 sec. 3 points 2–3 PL apply only in the process of issuing a permit to operate a generally accessible pharmacy or also in the course of conducting business in the form of a generally accessible pharmacy, and whether, in the event of a violation of the provisions of Art. 99 sec. 3 points 2–3 PL the legal basis for withdrawing the permit is Art. 37ap sec. 1 point 2 PL? The analysis carried out in the article leads to the conclusion that the provisions of Art. 99 sec. 3 points 2–3 PL the requirements to meet anti-concentration restrictions are conditions not only for obtaining a permit, but also it is necessary to comply with them throughout the entire period of conducting business in the form of a generally accessible pharmacy. In addition, in the event of a breach of the requirements set out in Art. 99 sec. 3 PL, the legal basis for withdrawing the permit is art. 99 sec. 3 points 2–3 PL in connection with Art. 37ap sec. 1 point 2 PL.

The State's involvement in the economy tends to increase as the economic situation worsens. At the same time there is an observable decline in private sector investments. In this context, this paper aims to put forward a case for revision of the Market Economy Operator Test (MEOT) to better reflect these evolving market conditions. The analysis will seek to verify the initial assumption that the current interpretative approach to the MEOT may fail to recognize the difference between rational and realistic transactions and to determine whether improvements are possible, feasible and appropriate under the EU Treaties.

The publication refers to the content of PPAs (Power Purchase Agreements), which are concluded by participants of the electricity market from renewable sources. It is important that the parties to the PPA are not limited by public law regulations in the scope of exercising the civil law freedom of contract. In the area of the principle of freedom of contract, parties concluding a PPA contract may therefore exclude the application of the rebus sic stantibus clause. Therefore, the aim of the publication will be to answer the question of what importance is attached to the rebus sic stantibus clause in the area of concluding PPAs and whether the parties to such an agreement should exclude its application.

The purpose of the article is to answer the question whether, with regard to the limitation period for claims arising from a contract of carriage under the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), the principle provided for in Article 118, second sentence, of the Civil Code, according to which the end of the limitation period of at least two years falls on the last day of the calendar year, should be applied. The author bases these reflections on the premise that since the CMR Convention does not regulate international road transportation comprehensively, it is necessary to apply the relevant domestic law in the unregulated area. If this were Polish law, then the application of Article 118, second sentence, of the Civil Code may be considered with regard to the issue of the statute of limitations. The article presents both arguments for and against such a view. Ultimately, the author comes to the conclusion that the mechanism for extending the limitation period to the end of the calendar year should not be applied to the limitation periods provided for in the CMR Convention.

Obligation to carry out a creditworthiness assessment due to Article 70.1 of the Banking Law is usually considered a public-law obligation of a bank, without affecting the private-law sphere of a loan agreement. The commented judgment of the Court of Appeal breaks the above interpretation. The gloss approving this ruling presents arguments supporting the thesis on the informative significance of a positive creditworthiness test result and its impact on the assessment of the bank's performance of pre-contractual obligations. Such a change in the interpretation of the provision justifies judicial interference in the contract, concluded in breach of pre-contractual rules of conduct, and enables the Polish legal system to be adapted to European standards, where the obligation to assess creditworthiness is a tool for protecting borrowers, related to private law sanctions.