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Dr Wojciech Arndt
ORCID: 0000-0002-5804-5215

Doctor of Laws (Faculty of Law and Ad­ministration of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw). Graduate of the Faculty of Law and Adminis­tration of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. As­sistant Professor at the Institute of Political and Admin­istrative Sciences of Ignatianum University in Krakow. Attorney at law.

 
DOI: 10.33226/0032-6186.2025.11.7
JEL: K22, M12

The article presents the significance of the legislative change of 2016 introducing an additional mechanism for remunerating managers of companies with State Treas­ury shareholding. Variable remuneration should be con­sidered a valuable and necessary instrument motivating management staff. An important intention of the authors of this act is to link the remuneration of persons manag­ing companies with State Treasury shareholding with the actual development and increase in the value of the man­aged entities. It is worth noting that the adopted mecha­nism serves to eliminate the threats indicated in the agency theory, describing the differences between the interests of the company and the interests of the manager. The conse­quences of such conflicting interests seem quite obvious, which the adopted regulations are intended to prevent. The current model does not mean full protection of the in­terests of companies, as it requires precise development of management goals by corporate supervision and supervi­sory bodies, whose activities should be associated with the professional use of full knowledge of the current activities of the company.

Keywords: variable remuneration; State Treasury companies; agency theory